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Section II. GERMAN EMPLOYMENT OF TROOP-CARRIER UNITS
In Holland in 1940, the Germans came to realize the disadvantage
of the parachute commander's inability to exercise any direct
authority over the troop-carrier units; the two were coordinated,
but neither was subordinate to the other. Consequently, before
carrying out the Crete operation the troop-carrier units were
incorporated into the parachute corps, of which they constituted an
integral part under a special Luftwaffe officer (Fliegerfuehrer). This
arrangement did not last long. The operations in Russia and North
Africa required the concentration of all air transport services directly
under the commander in chief of the Luftwaffe to assure the prompt
execution of any air transport operations which might become
necessary, and only in the rarest cases did this involve carrying
paratroops. As a result the training of troop-carrier units was also
reorganized. The pilots were then trained to fly in "main bodies"
(Pulk) or in a "stream of bombers" (Bomberstrom), that is, in
irregular formations which were always three dimensional. However,
it is impossible to drop parachutists from the Pulk or Bomberstrom
formations; dropping parachutists requires a regular flight in
formation at a uniform altitude, that is, a two-dimensional flight.
The close flight order of the conventional heavy bomber formation,
with its effective cross fire on all sides, is desirable for approach
flights across hostile territory. It provides defense against enemy
fighter planes and can be maintained until shortly before the
parachute or airplane landings. If there is a probability of strong
antiaircraft fire, the plane-to-plane and group-to-group spacing will
have to be increased. For such tactics, intensive training of the
troop-carrier pilots will be necessary, especially in the proper
deployment preparatory to parachute drops.
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Losses during the attack on Leros in the autumn of 1943 are said to
have occurred mainly because the troop carriers did not fly in
regular formation and at the same altitude; during the air landing in
the Ardennes in December 1944 it proved a fatal mistake that the
troop-carrier units were no longer accustomed to flying in regular
formation. The experience gained both at Leros and in the Ardennes
has shown that it is essential for a troop-carrier unit which is to
drop parachutists to be trained to do this work, since a good part of
the success of an airborne operation depends on flying in regular
close formation at the same altitude. It is obvious that the
necessary training in formation flying is best achieved if the troop-
carrier units are subordinated to the command of airborne troops
from the very first. Up to the end of the war the German paratroop
command continued to demand that it be given permanent control
over the troop-carrier units, but this demand remained unfulfilled.
That the troop-carrier units must be subordinate to the airborne
command at least for the duration of an operation is clear to
everyone. The fallacy of letting non-specialists make decisions in
such matters was demonstrated in the less than brilliant direction of
the Leros operation by a naval officer (the Commanding Admiral,
Aegean). Likewise the Ardennes operation, which was prepared by
an Air officer (the Air Force Commander, West), and carried out by
an Army officer (the Commanding General, Sixth SS Panzer Army);
one knew as little about an airborne operation and its difficulties as
did the other.
Although the problem of cooperation between the airborne
command and the command of the troop-carrier units was solved at
least temporarily during the Crete operation, the cooperation, or
lack of it, between the individual airborne unit and the individual
troop-carrier squadron continued to be the greatest cause of
complaint by the airborne troops during the entire war. At best, the
individual airborne battalion commander became personally
acquainted with the commander of the transport group which flew
his battalion only 2 or 3 days before the operation; as a rule, the
individual soldier did not establish any contact with the flying crew
of the machine which had to transport him. There was no mutual
understanding of peculiarities, capabilities, and shortcomings. The
2d Battalion of the 1st Paratroop Regiment was almost completely
annihilated in Crete because the battalion commander of the
airborne troops greatly overestimated the flying ability of the troop
carrier unit which was to carry his men, whereas the commander of
the troop-carrier force, on the other hand, did not understand the
extremely elaborate plan of attack of the airborne commander, who
was a complete stranger to him. In former times one would not
require a cavalry regiment to carry out an attack when its men had
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only been given a short course in riding but had not been issued
any horses until the night before the attack.
Next to the pilot, the most important man in the flying crew was the
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